I completed my Ph.D. in Behavioral Decision Research, where my research focused on two areas: 1) how to structure communication in ways that lead to better outcomes when interests are overlapping but not perfectly aligned, and 2) how social preferences such as concerns about fairness and aversion to lying affect people's decisions.
Coordination with Decentralized Costly Communication
with Andreas Blume and Roberto Weber
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 130, October 2016, pp. 225–241
Prior experimental evidence finds decentralized pre-play communication to facilitate efficient coordination among interdependent agents. However, the kind of communication in these experiments is unrealistic for many economic and organizational contexts, as it consists of costless messages from every agent, which are sent every time a coordination game is played. We study how communication use and its effectiveness change when one considers that sending messages is often both costly and voluntary, and investigate the effectiveness of alternative communication policies employed by a firm. The policies differ in the degree to which message use is voluntary and in who bears the costs for communication. Imposing even small communication costs on employees dramatically reduces message use, but message use is more prevalent and efficient coordination occurs more frequently when the proportion of message costs borne by employees is small. We conclude that under certain conditions, large but incomplete subsidies for using communication can be an optimal solution for obtaining efficient coordination in firms.
Link to Article. An earlier draft of this article can be found as Chapter 4 in my dissertation.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 130, October 2016, pp. 225–241
Prior experimental evidence finds decentralized pre-play communication to facilitate efficient coordination among interdependent agents. However, the kind of communication in these experiments is unrealistic for many economic and organizational contexts, as it consists of costless messages from every agent, which are sent every time a coordination game is played. We study how communication use and its effectiveness change when one considers that sending messages is often both costly and voluntary, and investigate the effectiveness of alternative communication policies employed by a firm. The policies differ in the degree to which message use is voluntary and in who bears the costs for communication. Imposing even small communication costs on employees dramatically reduces message use, but message use is more prevalent and efficient coordination occurs more frequently when the proportion of message costs borne by employees is small. We conclude that under certain conditions, large but incomplete subsidies for using communication can be an optimal solution for obtaining efficient coordination in firms.
Link to Article. An earlier draft of this article can be found as Chapter 4 in my dissertation.
Turning a Blind Eye, But Not the Other Cheek: On the Robustness of Costly Punishment
with Roberto Weber and Erte Xiao
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 128, August 2016, pp. 159–177
The willingness to punish norm violation is an important component of many legal and social institutions, and much prior research demonstrates an apparent willingness to incur costs to punish individuals who act unfairly. But, will people rely on “excuses” to get out of having to act on costly punishment intentions, as they do with other costly pro-social acts? And how may the answer to this question depend on whether the punisher is the victim of a norm violation or an independent third party? We conduct an experiment and find that third parties punish reluctantly: although they indicate a preference to punish, they choose to avoid the opportunity to punish when they can do so without explicitly revealing that this is their preference. In contrast, second parties, who have been directly wronged, are resolute punishers—they actively seek out the opportunity to punish, even misrepresenting random outcomes in order to ensure that punishment is implemented. Our findings highlight important differences in the motives underlying second- and third-party punishment.
Link to Article (or free pre-publication draft)
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 128, August 2016, pp. 159–177
The willingness to punish norm violation is an important component of many legal and social institutions, and much prior research demonstrates an apparent willingness to incur costs to punish individuals who act unfairly. But, will people rely on “excuses” to get out of having to act on costly punishment intentions, as they do with other costly pro-social acts? And how may the answer to this question depend on whether the punisher is the victim of a norm violation or an independent third party? We conduct an experiment and find that third parties punish reluctantly: although they indicate a preference to punish, they choose to avoid the opportunity to punish when they can do so without explicitly revealing that this is their preference. In contrast, second parties, who have been directly wronged, are resolute punishers—they actively seek out the opportunity to punish, even misrepresenting random outcomes in order to ensure that punishment is implemented. Our findings highlight important differences in the motives underlying second- and third-party punishment.
Link to Article (or free pre-publication draft)
Pre-Play Communication with Forgone Costly Messages: Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction
with Andreas Blume and Roberto Weber
Experimental Economics, Vol. 20, Issue 2, June 2016, pp. 368-395
We experimentally study optional costly communication in Stag-Hunt games. Prior research demonstrates that efficient coordination is difficult without a communication option but obtains regularly with mandatory costless pre-play messages. We find that even small communication costs dramatically reduce message use when communication is optional, but efficient coordination can occur with similar frequency as under costless communication. These findings can be accounted for by formalizations of forward induction that take Nash equilibrium as a reference point (such as Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and Govindan and Wilson (2009)), while formalizations that only appeal to (higher-order) knowledge of rationality remain silent in this environment.
Link to Article. An earlier draft of this article can be found as Chapter 3 in my dissertation.
Experimental Economics, Vol. 20, Issue 2, June 2016, pp. 368-395
We experimentally study optional costly communication in Stag-Hunt games. Prior research demonstrates that efficient coordination is difficult without a communication option but obtains regularly with mandatory costless pre-play messages. We find that even small communication costs dramatically reduce message use when communication is optional, but efficient coordination can occur with similar frequency as under costless communication. These findings can be accounted for by formalizations of forward induction that take Nash equilibrium as a reference point (such as Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and Govindan and Wilson (2009)), while formalizations that only appeal to (higher-order) knowledge of rationality remain silent in this environment.
Link to Article. An earlier draft of this article can be found as Chapter 3 in my dissertation.
Implicit vs. Explicit Deception in Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information
with Rosemarie Nagel and Roberto Weber
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 93, September 2013, pp. 337–346
We explore bargaining, using ultimatum games, when one party, the proposer, possesses private information about the pie size and can either misrepresent this information through untruthful statements (explicit deception) or through information-revealing actions (implicit deception). Our study is the first such direct comparison between two ways in which people can deceive. We find that requiring informed parties to make an explicit statement yields greater deception than when information is communicated implicitly, particularly for larger stakes. However, allowing the explicit statement to be accompanied by a promise of truthfulness reverses this effect. In contrast with many previous studies, we generally observe very high frequencies of dishonesty.
Link to Article (or free pre-publication draft)
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 93, September 2013, pp. 337–346
We explore bargaining, using ultimatum games, when one party, the proposer, possesses private information about the pie size and can either misrepresent this information through untruthful statements (explicit deception) or through information-revealing actions (implicit deception). Our study is the first such direct comparison between two ways in which people can deceive. We find that requiring informed parties to make an explicit statement yields greater deception than when information is communicated implicitly, particularly for larger stakes. However, allowing the explicit statement to be accompanied by a promise of truthfulness reverses this effect. In contrast with many previous studies, we generally observe very high frequencies of dishonesty.
Link to Article (or free pre-publication draft)
Organizational Formation and Change: Lessons from Economic Laboratory Experiments
with Roberto Weber
Handbook of Economic Organization: Integrating Economic and Organizational Theory, A. Grandori (ed.), Edward Elgar, March 2013.
This chapter reviews research in which economic laboratory experiments are used to shed light on the processes that influence organizational formation and change. An organization, in these experiments, is represented by an abstract collective production activity that takes place in a controlled laboratory setting with incentivized human subjects. The studies typically attempt to identify factors that enhance efficient production and coordination. Our review focuses on studies that explore key features of how organizations originate, grow, and implement change, and the roles of communication and leadership in managing these processes. Our survey concludes that laboratory experiments of this type present a useful way to identify important factors that influence the relationship between individual behaviors and organizational performance at critical stages, which might otherwise be difficult to isolate outside the laboratory. Moreover, this research presents a valuable complement to traditional approaches in organizational research.
An earlier draft of this book chapter can be found as Chapter 2 in my dissertation.
Handbook of Economic Organization: Integrating Economic and Organizational Theory, A. Grandori (ed.), Edward Elgar, March 2013.
This chapter reviews research in which economic laboratory experiments are used to shed light on the processes that influence organizational formation and change. An organization, in these experiments, is represented by an abstract collective production activity that takes place in a controlled laboratory setting with incentivized human subjects. The studies typically attempt to identify factors that enhance efficient production and coordination. Our review focuses on studies that explore key features of how organizations originate, grow, and implement change, and the roles of communication and leadership in managing these processes. Our survey concludes that laboratory experiments of this type present a useful way to identify important factors that influence the relationship between individual behaviors and organizational performance at critical stages, which might otherwise be difficult to isolate outside the laboratory. Moreover, this research presents a valuable complement to traditional approaches in organizational research.
An earlier draft of this book chapter can be found as Chapter 2 in my dissertation.
Behind the Veil of Ignorance: Self-Serving Bias in Climate Change Negotiations
with George Loewenstein, Xianghong Shirley Wang, and Roberto Weber
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 6, No. 7, October 2011, pp. 602–615
Slowing climate change will almost certainly require a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, but agreement on who should reduce emissions by how much is difficult, in part because of the self-serving bias—the tendency to believe that what is beneficial to oneself is also fair. Conducting surveys among college students in the United States and China, we show that each of these groups displays a nationalistic self-serving bias in judgments of a fair distribution of economic burdens resulting from mitigation. Yet, we also show, by disguising the problem and the identity of the parties, that it is possible to elicit perceptions of fairness that are not influenced by national interests. Our research reveals that the self-serving bias plays a major role in the difficulty of obtaining agreement on how to implement emissions reductions. That is, the disagreement over what constitutes fair climate policy does not appear to be due to cross-national differences in what constitutes a fair distribution of burdens. Interventions to mitigate the self-serving bias may facilitate agreement.
Link to Article (open access)
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 6, No. 7, October 2011, pp. 602–615
Slowing climate change will almost certainly require a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, but agreement on who should reduce emissions by how much is difficult, in part because of the self-serving bias—the tendency to believe that what is beneficial to oneself is also fair. Conducting surveys among college students in the United States and China, we show that each of these groups displays a nationalistic self-serving bias in judgments of a fair distribution of economic burdens resulting from mitigation. Yet, we also show, by disguising the problem and the identity of the parties, that it is possible to elicit perceptions of fairness that are not influenced by national interests. Our research reveals that the self-serving bias plays a major role in the difficulty of obtaining agreement on how to implement emissions reductions. That is, the disagreement over what constitutes fair climate policy does not appear to be due to cross-national differences in what constitutes a fair distribution of burdens. Interventions to mitigate the self-serving bias may facilitate agreement.
Link to Article (open access)
Managers as Coordinating Devices: Keep Your Door Open, But Your Skin Thick
with David Eil
Using a multi-player coordination game with a centralized communication structure, we explore how the ability of organizational members to send messages to a manager impacts the credibility of communication from that manager. We find that such “open door” policies do indeed enhance the mutual confidence that others will follow the manager’s recommendation and that this can lead to improved coordination and efficiency. However, after receiving discouraging messages from employees, managers often pass on this (self-fulfilling) pessimism about the group’s ability to coordinate. We conclude that a better understanding of how communication channels impact the credibility of leaders, along with the wisdom of managers to ignore counterproductive input, has significant potential to improve coordination within organizations.
A draft of this article can be found as Chapter 5 in my dissertation.
Using a multi-player coordination game with a centralized communication structure, we explore how the ability of organizational members to send messages to a manager impacts the credibility of communication from that manager. We find that such “open door” policies do indeed enhance the mutual confidence that others will follow the manager’s recommendation and that this can lead to improved coordination and efficiency. However, after receiving discouraging messages from employees, managers often pass on this (self-fulfilling) pessimism about the group’s ability to coordinate. We conclude that a better understanding of how communication channels impact the credibility of leaders, along with the wisdom of managers to ignore counterproductive input, has significant potential to improve coordination within organizations.
A draft of this article can be found as Chapter 5 in my dissertation.